Populism as a dimension and logical aspect of politics: proposals, significance and limits of Laclau’s theory of populism

Abstract

This article exposes Laclau’s theoretical proposal of populism. Laclau, dissociating from the traditional form of studying the term, emphasizes that what makes populism different is its ontological and not its ontic nature, so populism would be defined as a hegemonic discursive “game” (subsumed in differential-equivalent logics) between the people and the power spheres. The article has two theoretical sections: the first one is about Laclau’s theory and the main theses that make his proposal a renewed contribution to “populist theory”. The second section contests the theoretical model proposed by Laclau, based on three authors: Aboy Carlés, Barrios and Burdman. We state that if the limits of Laclau’s proposal are not theoretically solved, specifically regarding establishing greater theoretical interrelation between form and content, between populist and institutional logics, it is quite unlikely that subsequent studies will be able to establish a deeper connection with experience.